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NOTES
REVISITING THE “MERGER PROBLEM” IN MONEY
LAUNDERING PROSECUTIONS POST-SANTOS
AND THE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND
RECOVERY ACT OF 2009
LESLIE A. DICKINSON*
INTRODUCTION
Congress and the Supreme Court often disagree on the meaning,
scope, and language of federal statutes—the interpretation of the word
“proceeds” in the federal money laundering statute is one such disa-
greement.  The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1), punishes persons
engaging in certain “financial transactions” that involve “proceeds” of
“specified unlawful activities” (predicate offenses which include virtu-
ally all white-collar crimes as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)).1
However, as initially drafted, the statute did not define the term “pro-
ceeds.”  Thus, federal courts of appeals disagreed on the appropriate
meaning—some defining the term narrowly to mean only “net profits”
(revenues left over after expenses are paid for the underlying offense),
and others defining it more broadly as “gross receipts” (all funds stem-
ming from the underlying offense).2  Defining “proceeds” narrowly
would make it more difficult for prosecutors to convict because they
would, under the statute, need to prove a defendant’s gross criminal
earnings, subtract all total expenses, and show that the money involved
in the financial transaction constituted net profits.  In contrast, with
gross receipts, prosecutors only need to prove the base earnings.3  How-
ever, defining “proceeds” more broadly allows prosecutors to, in some
circumstances, convict criminal defendants under the money launder-
ing statute by merely proving the underlying crime.4  In other words,
proving the underlying predicate offense automatically proves the
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2014; B.A., University of Michigan,
2011.  Special thanks to Professor Jimmy Gurulé for his help and guidance during the
preparation of this Note.  I would also like to thank my parents, brother, family, and
friends for their love and encouragement.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012).
2. See discussion infra Part I.
3. Jimmy Gurulé, Does “Proceeds” Really Mean “Net Profits”? The Supreme Court’s Efforts
to Diminish the Utility of the Federal Money Laundering Statute, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 339, 340
(2009).
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money laundering offense for the same act(s).  This is particularly prob-
lematic when the penalty for the predicate offense is substantially lower
than that for the money laundering offense.  This result could lead to
punishments over and above the defendant’s moral culpability for the
underlying act and is inconsistent with congressional intent.5
In United States v. Santos,6 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue.  Santos was charged with operating an illegal gam-
bling business that used receipts from bets to pay the lottery’s winners
and employees.7  Santos was convicted under the money laundering
statute, which imposed a 210-month sentence,8 and under the illegal
gambling statute, which imposed a 60-month sentence.9  The district
court defined “proceeds” as “gross receipts” under the money launder-
ing statute.10  The result of this interpretation meant that the evidence
proving the illegal gambling offense also satisfied the “proceeds” ele-
ment of the money laundering statute.  Because he was convicted of
both, Santos received a sentence of twelve and a half more years in
federal prison than he would have if he had only been convicted of the
illegal gambling offense.11
Santos appealed, and the Seventh Circuit weighed in on the issue,
favoring the “net profits” interpretation and holding that the “gross
receipts” interpretation would merge the money laundering offense
with the separate underlying gambling offense, essentially punishing
the defendant twice for the same criminal act (“The Merger Prob-
lem”).12  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Sev-
enth Circuit’s decision in a fractured four to one to four opinion with
Justice Scalia writing for the plurality.13  The merging of the two
offenses was particularly important in the Santos case because it
involved a prosecution under the “promotional theory” of the money
laundering statute which deals with fraudulent transactions involving
the “carrying on of specified unlawful activity” into future acts of crimi-
nality.14  Scalia argues that virtually every payment in such gambling
operations promote the carrying on of the lottery.15  Thus, a narrower
definition of “proceeds” is necessary so that not all payments are consid-
ered both a violation of the money laundering statute and the underly-
5. Id. at 506 (“[T]he consequences of applying a ‘gross receipts’ definition of ‘pro-
ceeds’ to respondents are so perverse that Congress could not have contemplated them
. . . ”).
6. 553 U.S. 507 (2008).
7. Id. at 507.
8. Id. at 510 (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(I)(A)(i) (2012)).
9. Id. (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955(h) (2012)).
10. Id.
11. Rachel Zimarowski, Note, Taking A Gamble: Money Laundering After United States
v. Santos, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (2010).
12. Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir. 2006).
13. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 515 (2008).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(I)(A)(i) (2012); See discussion infra Part I.
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ing gambling offense—a result Congress surely would not have
intended.16
The scope of this holding, however, also applies to the “conceal-
ment theory” of the money laundering statute, which deals with transac-
tions that are designed solely to “conceal or disguise the proceeds from
the unlawful activity.”17  Unless “proceeds” means different things
under the statute depending on the type of transaction (there is no
evidence in the statutory text that it does), then Santos’ “net profits”
interpretation would apply to both types of transactions.18  What Scalia
fails to recognize, however, is that this merger problem is not present in
concealment theory cases because most of the underlying offenses
within the scope of the money laundering statute do not require proof
that a defendant conducted a financial transaction with the intent to
conceal the proceeds of the criminal activity.19  Thus, a defendant’s
guilt, for example, in operating an illegal gambling business under 18
U.S.C. § 1955(a) would not automatically establish a violation of the
federal money laundering statute under the concealment theory in 18
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).  Because this double conviction problem
does not apply to concealment cases, Scalia’s concern is overstated.
Rather, the “merger problem” would only apply to a narrower subset of
cases—those that involve the promotional theory of the money launder-
ing statute.
After Santos, federal courts of appeals were divided on the scope of
the Supreme Court’s holding.  Some courts interpreted Santos to only
apply in situations where illegal gambling was the predicate offense
(the narrow view).20  Other courts applied the “profits” definition to
some cases and “gross receipts” to others depending on (1) the poten-
tial for a merger problem causing a radical increase in the statutory
maximum sentence and (2) the legislative intent and history of that
predicate offense (the moderate view).21  Finally, other courts inter-
preted the holding to apply to all predicate offenses (the broad view).22
The issue became more complex when, one year after the case was
decided, Congress enacted the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of
2009 (“FERA”).23  Section 2(f)(1) of FERA amends the money launder-
ing statute to define “proceeds” to include “gross receipts” of the unlaw-
ful activity, essentially overturning Santos.24  As discussed, the merger
problem would then continue to be an issue for (1) money laundering
cases under the promotional theory where the transactions in the
underlying offenses were promoting or continuing the carrying-on of
16. Id.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(I)(B)(i) (2012); See discussion infra Part I.
18. Gurulé, supra note 3, at 340.
19. Id. at 357–58.
20. See discussion infra Part III.A.
21. See discussion infra Part III.B.
22. See discussion infra Part III.C.
23. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat.
1617 (2009).
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the offense,25 and (2) cases involving transactions that facilitate the
already conducted specified unlawful activity under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(3)(C).26
FERA attempts to combat the merger problem by stating that,
when prosecuting cases where the money laundering offense is closely
connected to the specified unlawful offense, to the extent that there is
no clear delineation between the two offenses, prior approval from a
superior Department of Justice (DOJ) official is required.27  This
requirement is not an adequate solution to the problem.  There are no
limitations on higher officials’ discretion for authorizing these prosecu-
tions, and the language of the requirement itself is written vaguely.  Fur-
thermore, this merger problem applies to many other underlying white-
collar criminal offenses, not just illegal gambling. It may occur in Ponzi
schemes and mortgage, healthcare, mail, and bank fraud cases that deal
with fraudulent financial transactions.28
Because the merger problem still exists for a subset of cases and
can apply to a number of other underlying offenses, prosecutors and
judges need more guidance when determining whether such cases are
to be prosecuted and how they are to be handled in sentencing.  The
Department of Justice, the Federal Sentencing Commission, and Con-
gress must go further by amending both the money laundering statute
itself and the statute’s sentencing guidelines. The DOJ should also
adopt policies to limit the number of prosecutions where merger
problems could exist, especially when there is potential for substantially
larger sentences.29  Absent exigent circumstances, there should be a
strong preference amongst DOJ officials to decline authorization of
these prosecutions.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986, the proof necessary to obtain a conviction under
both the promotional and concealment theories, and why the applica-
tion of the term “proceeds” in the Act was initially unclear.  Part II
examines the Santos decision and Scalia’s merger argument.  Part III
considers money laundering cases post-Santos, but pre-FERA, and dis-
cusses how different appellate courts have interpreted the decision.
Part IV explains Congress’ response to Santos, the implementation of
FERA, and FERA’s current, unknown legacy on case law.  Part V dis-
cusses the viability and scope of the merger problem, Scalia’s overstate-
ment of the issue, and why FERA does not go far enough.  Finally, this
Note concludes by proposing potential amendments to the federal sen-
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(I)(A)(i) (2012).
26. See discussion infra Part V.
27. § 2, 123 Stat. at 1619 (“Sense of the Congress and Report Concerning Merger
Cases”).
28. See discussion infra Part V.A. The FBI has listed these offenses in particular,
among few others, as “priority crime problem areas of the Financial Crimes Section of the
FBI.” Gerald Cliff & Christian Desilets, White Collar Crime: What It Is and Where It’s Going, 28
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 481, 484 n.12 (2014) (citation omitted).
29. See discussion infra Part V.C. Oftentimes, the money laundering offense will call
for a more severe sentence than the underlying offense. See, e.g., United States v. Santos,
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tencing guidelines, the money laundering statute itself, and the Depart-
ment of Justice manual to find a balance in addressing any existing
merger problems.
I. THE MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL ACT OF 1986
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (“MLCA”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956, makes it a federal crime to knowingly engage in a financial
transaction that involves “proceeds” from “specified unlawful activity”
with the intent to either (1) promote the carrying on of, or (2) conceal
the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of proceeds from
the underlying offense.30  The purposes of the MLCA were to criminal-
ize the concealment of illegal income and to stop the illegal funding of
criminal enterprises that further their existence.31  The MLCA has
expanded to include over 200 specified unlawful crimes including most
white-collar offenses.32  Because of this, charging under section 1956
often involves indictments for other predicate offenses, with the section
1956 offense usually calling for a harsher penalty.33
Subsections 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i) cover the promo-
tional and concealment theories respectively.  Each requires different
proof in order to sustain a conviction.  Under the promotional theory,
the government must prove that the defendant knowingly (1) con-
ducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction (2) that repre-
sented some form of an unlawful activity, (3) the proceeds of which
were derived from that specified unlawful activity, and (4) the transac-
tion was done with the intent to promote the carrying on of the specified
unlawful activity.34  For the concealment theory, the government must
prove that the defendant knowingly (1) conducted or attempted to con-
duct a financial transaction (2) that represented some form of criminal
activity, (3) the proceeds of which were derived from that specified
unlawful activity, and (4) the transaction was designed in whole or in
part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of
the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity.35
Subsection 1956(c) defines various terms used in the MLCA and
applies these definitions to both the promotional and concealment the-
ories.  “Transaction,” as used in the MLCA, is broadly defined to
include purchases, sales, loans, pledges, gifts, transfers, deliveries, or
30. Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207
(1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2012)). The MLCA also criminalizes
fraudulent financial tractions with the intent to avoid an IRS reporting requirement for
proceeds used to conduct or facilitate the underlying offense. Id.
31. Gurulé, supra note 3, at 351–52.
32. Zimarowski, supra note 11, at 1144.
33. Id. at 1145.
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012). See United States v. Calderon, 169 F.3d
718, 721 (11th Cir. 1999) (listing elements of the offense under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012). See United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d
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other dispositions.36  “Financial transactions” under section 1956 are
transactions which either (1) affect interstate or foreign commerce
involving (i) movement of funds by wire or other means, (ii) one or
more monetary instruments, or (iii) involving transfer of title to any
real property, vehicle or aircraft, or (2) involves the use of a financial
institution which is engaged in or affects interstate or foreign com-
merce in any way or degree.37  The term “specified unlawful activity”
includes all racketeering offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) and
other offenses, such as those committed against foreign nations, the
distribution of controlled substances, crimes of violence, bank fraud,
bribery, theft, embezzlement, human trafficking, and numerous other
federal felonies.38
Notably lacking from the statute is a definition for the term “pro-
ceeds” as it applies to both the promotional and concealment theories.
The lack of clear statutory intent has caused confusion over whether
“proceeds” means “net profits” or “gross receipts.”39  The controversy
began in 2002 when the Seventh Circuit deviated from precedent in
United States v. Scialabba.40  Before this decision, courts consistently
interpreted “proceeds” to mean “gross receipts.”41  In Scialabba, the
defendants were convicted of running an illegal gambling business, fil-
ing false tax returns, conspiring to defeat tax collection, and money
laundering.42  The defendants appealed their money laundering con-
victions, arguing that the convictions substantially augmented their
sentences.43  Judge Easterbrook wrote the opinion for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, holding that the money laundering statute is ambiguous as to “pro-
ceeds” so the rule of lenity must apply.44  In other words, because
Congress did not specify that “proceeds” be interpreted to include all
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3) (2012). See United States v. Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 160
(5th Cir. 1998) (defining “transaction” under section 1956 to include transferring money
to another); United States v. Gough, 152 F.3d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that
delivery of drug money is a “transaction” under section 1956); United States v. Leslie, 103
F.3d 1093, 1101 (2d Cir. 1997) (including a check exchange for cash as a “transaction”
under section 1956).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (2012). See United States v. Goodwin, 141 F.3d 394, 401
(2d Cir. 1997) (listing the elements defining a “financial transaction” under section
1956).  The term is broadly defined. See United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257
(8th Cir. 1990) (finding that a “[‘financial transaction’] includes the purchase, sale or
disposition of any kind of property as long as the disposition involves a monetary
instrument.”).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7) (2012). See United States v. Yusuf, 536 F.3d 178, 185 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“The term ‘specified unlawful activity’ covers a broad range of offenses.  For
example, the fraudulent concealment of a bankruptcy estate’s assets is categorized as a
‘specified unlawful activity.’”); United States v. Taylor, 984 F.2d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1993)
(listing the elements defining a “specified unlawful activity” under section 1956 and hold-
ing that wire fraud is a specified unlawful activity under this definition).
39. See supra INTRODUCTION for explanations of the two terms.
40. 282 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2002).
41. William T. Noonan, Jr., Congress’ Failure to Define Proceeds and the Fallout After
United States v. Santos, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 133, 134 (2010).
42. Scialabba, 282 F.3d at 475.
43. Id. at 476.
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gross receipts, the courts must take the approach that favors the defen-
dant—in this case, “net profits”—which imposes a higher burden of
proof on the government.45  Judge Easterbrook was also the first to
bring up the merger argument for the “net profits” definition stating
that, if courts did not apply the “net profits” definition, “the predicate
crime [would otherwise] merge[ ] into money laundering . . . and the
word ‘proceeds’ [would otherwise] lose[ ] operational significance.”46
The defendants in this case had transferred some of the revenue from
illegal video poker machines to meet expenses of the gambling busi-
ness.47  The Court held that these “gross receipts” from the sales were
not used to hide or reinvest in the illegal business—the normal under-
standing of money laundering—and, because “proceeds” must be read
as “profits,” the transactions that used gross receipts did not constitute
money laundering.48
The Third Circuit in United States v. Grasso49 later rejected the Sev-
enth Circuit’s rationale. Judge Ambro held, instead, that “proceeds”
means “gross receipts,” not “net profits.”  In Grasso, the defendant was
convicted of mail fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering by reinvest-
ing proceeds of a fraudulent “work-at-home” scheme to cover advertis-
ing, printing, and mailing expenses.50  The Court held that the text and
purpose of section 1956, along with existing case law in the Third Cir-
cuit, suggests that “proceeds” means “gross receipts.”51  When reinvest-
ing his proceeds in furtherance of his fraudulent activity, Grasso paid
for his business expenses with the receipts from his illegal sales, thus
implicating the money laundering offense.52  Because the Third Circuit
rejected the Seventh Circuit’s most recent interpretation of “proceeds”
at that time, other jurisdictions continued to struggle with determining
which definition was correct.  The Supreme Court was, thus, posed to
resolve this conflict four years later when the Court granted certiorari
to Santos.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 475.
47. Id. at 476.
48. Id.
49. 381 F.3d 160, 166 (3d Cir. 2004).
50. Id. at 162.
51. Id. at 168.  The Court looked to varying definitions of the word “proceeds” in
the UCC, Black’s Law Dictionary and Webster’s Dictionary which all defined the term as “the
total amount brought in” or, similarly, “gross receipts.” Id.  In their examination of prior
precedent, the Court noted “most courts have held that proceeds involve more than net
profits.” Id.  Finally, the Court looked to the text of the statute itself stating “[t]he ‘nor-
mal understanding of money laundering’ may entail ‘hid[ing] or invest[ing] profits in
order to evade detection,’ as the Seventh Circuit posited, but the bifurcated text of the
statute strongly suggests that Congress had a broader definition of money laundering in
mind.” Id. (citation omitted).
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II. UNITED STATES V. SANTOS
In United States v. Santos,53 Efrain Santos was convicted of conspir-
acy to run an illegal gambling business,54 running an illegal gambling
business,55 conspiracy to money launder,56 and two counts of money
laundering.57  Santos ran an illegal lottery in Indiana.58  He employed
helpers who gathered bets from gamblers, kept a portion for their com-
missions, and delivered the rest to collectors.59  These collectors would
then deliver the money back to Santos, who used the money left over to
pay the winners and the salaries of the collectors.60
Santos was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment for the gam-
bling offenses and 210 months for the money laundering counts.61
Santos appealed and the Seventh Circuit court of appeals affirmed the
convictions.62  He then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, collater-
ally attacking the convictions.  The district court approved his motions
on the money laundering counts based on the Seventh Circuit’s hold-
ing in Scialabba.63  In applying Scialabba, the district court found noth-
ing to show that the transactions for which the money laundering
convictions were based involved profits.64  The court of appeals
affirmed, following the district court’s reliance on Scialabba.65  The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Stevens concurring, affirmed the Sev-
enth Circuit’s decision.66
Justice Scalia highlighted the inherent ambiguity of the term “pro-
ceeds.”67  He notes how some statutes that use the term have defined it
to mean “profits,” where others have defined it to mean “gross
receipts.”68  Furthermore, he points out that both definitions have long
been accepted in ordinary usage according to their dictionary defini-
tions.69  Because there is a true ambiguity in the meaning, Scalia argues
that the Court must use the rule of lenity and interpret the word in the
53. 553 U.S. 507 (2008).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2012).
56. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (h) (2012).
57. Id.
58. Santos, 553 U.S. at 509 (in violation of IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-5-3 (West 2007)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 510.  The money laundering conviction more than tripled Santos’ sen-
tence for the same criminal act as the underlying illegal gambling offense.
62. Id.
63. Id.; United States v. Scialabba, 282 F.3d 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
the federal money laundering statute’s prohibition of transactions involving “proceeds”
applies to “profits” not “gross receipts”); see discussion supra Part I.
64. Santos, 553 U.S. at 510.
65. Id.
66. Id. Justice Thomas joined all but Part IV of Justice Scalia’s opinion. Id. at 507.
67. Id. at 511.
68. Id. at 512.
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way that most favors the defendant subjected to the ambiguity.70  In this
case, the “profits” definition is more defendant-friendly than the
“receipts” definition because it places a higher burden of proof on the
prosecution, so the rule of lenity finds in favor of the “profits”
definition.71
Scalia’s second main argument for the “profits” definition is his
concern with the “merger problem.”72  He values the protection of
criminal defendants against mergers, arguing it could not be the intent
of Congress to leverage one criminal activity into another.73  He urges
that, “if ‘proceeds’ meant ‘receipts,’ nearly every violation of the illegal-
lottery statute would also be a violation of the money-laundering stat-
ute” because most, if not all, lotteries pay their winners and all of those
payments, in promoting the carrying on of the lottery, would violate
both statutes.74  As a result of this merger, defendants are confronted
with increased sentences—well beyond those for the underlying offense
giving rise to money laundering.75
Scalia also argues that this merger problem has widespread impli-
cations that go beyond just illegal gambling cases.76  “Generally speak-
ing, any specified unlawful activity, an episode of which includes
transactions which are not elements of the offense and in which a par-
ticipant passes receipts on to someone else, would merge with money
laundering.”77  He says that interpreting “proceeds” as “profits” elimi-
nates the merger problem for these offenses because it would only
apply to payments made above and beyond expenses paid to promote
the lottery itself.78  For example, the money laundering statute would
not apply to paying employees or rent for an office space because those
are not, by definition, “profits” or what remains after such expenses are
paid.79
Scalia further rejects other means of avoiding the merger prob-
lem—specifically, that the underlying offense and money laundering
offense be distinct in order to be separately punishable.80  He believes
this solution has no basis in the words of the statute and is an unpredict-
able method of solving the problem.81  He also rejects the govern-
ment’s argument that the “receipts” interpretation makes these cases
easier to prosecute.82  He notes that Congress has imposed similar bur-
70. Santos, 553 U.S. at 514. The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to
be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them. See United States v.
Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917).
71. Id. 514.
72. Id. at 515.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 516.
76. Id. at 517.
77. Id. at 516.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 518.
81. Id.
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dens of proof on prosecutors elsewhere and that the government exag-
gerates prosecutorial difficulties.83  Finally, Scalia emphasizes the
importance of maintaining a consistent meaning of “proceeds” for all
predicate crimes.84
Justice Stevens provided the fifth vote to affirm, concurring in the
judgment.85  Stevens argues that Congress intended for “proceeds” to
have the “profits” definition when referring to some predicate offenses
and the “receipts” definition when referring to others.86  He uses the
legislative history of section 1956 stating that Congress made it clear
that its intent for the term “proceeds” was to include gross receipts from
the sale of contraband and the operation of organized crime syndicates
involving such sales.87  However, for other predicate offenses like unli-
censed, stand-alone gambling ventures, there is no clear legislative his-
tory telling the courts how to interpret “proceeds.”88  For such
situations, Stevens uses Scalia’s congressional intent argument, stating
that “applying ‘gross receipts’ . . . [leads to consequences] so perverse
that I cannot believe they were contemplated by Congress.”89  He also
addresses the merger problem and argues that it would be particularly
unfair in this case to allow the government to treat the mere payment of
the expense of operating an illegal gambling business as a separate
offense because the money laundering offense creates a substantially
more severe sentence.90  Thus, the rule of lenity should apply for this
case.91
Justice Breyer wrote the first dissenting opinion.92  Breyer agrees
that the merger problem was probably not a result that Congress
intended.93  He, however, argues that defining “proceeds” as “profits” is
not the solution.94  He believes that the better approach is to interpret
the promotional theory to apply only where the money laundering
transaction occurs separately and after the underlying offense is commit-
ted.95  A person does not “promote the carrying on” of an underlying
offense with only one act—the phrase implies future action.96  In other
words, the money laundering offense and the underlying offense must
be distinct to be separately punishable with the money laundering
offense following in time the completion of the underlying offense.97  The
83. Id. at 519–20.
84. Id. at 522–23.
85. Id. at 524.
86. Id. at 525.
87. Id. at 525–26.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 526.
90. Id. at 527.
91. Id. at 528.
92. Id. at 529.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 530.
96. Id.
97. Id.  See Gurulé, supra note 3, at 376–77 (“For example, purchasing communica-
tions equipment, such as cell phones and fax machines, could violate the promotion the-
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money laundering transaction must promote the continuation of such
offense into the future, not merely facilitate it.
Breyer also argues that the problem can be adequately addressed
by the U.S. Sentencing Commission rather than in the courts.98
Because Congress has already instructed the Commission to “avoi[d]
unwarranted sentencing disparities” among similar criminal conduct,
the Commission could make the offense level closer to that of the
offense level for the predicate offense rather than “creating complex
interpretations of the statute’s language.”99
Justice Alito wrote the second dissent, which Chief Justice Roberts,
and Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined.100  Justice Alito is concerned
with Congress’ intent and believes that the plurality’s interpretation
would frustrate efforts to combat organized criminal enterprises if we
look to the context in which the word is used.101  His first argument is
that “proceeds” most customarily means “the total amount brought in”
or “gross receipts.”102  He points to the leading treaty on international
money laundering, the United Nations Convention Against Transna-
tional Organized Crime (“Convention”), which contains a provision
similar to that in the concealment theory of section 1956.103  Article 6.1
of the Convention criminalizes “[t]he . . . transfer of property, knowing
that such property is the proceeds of crime, for the purpose of conceal-
ing or disguising the illicit origin of the property . . . .”104  The Conven-
tion defines “proceeds” to mean “any property derived from or
obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an
offense.”105  This definition is more in line with a “gross receipts”
approach because it does not limit “proceeds” to just the profits of the
offense.106  Alito also points to the Model Money Laundering Act and
how it also defines “proceeds” as “property [of any kind] acquired or
derived directly or indirectly from, produced through, realized
through, or caused by an act or omission . . . .”107  Furthermore, he
notes that fourteen states have defined “proceeds” as “gross receipts” in
their state money laundering statutes.108  He argues that this “pattern
of usage” by lawmakers seems to suggest that “gross receipts” is the cus-
tomary definition for “proceeds” in a money laundering provision.109
step beyond the mere operation of the illegal gambling venture; the mere collection of
gambling receipts and payments to winning betters does not.”) (citation omitted).
98. Santos, 553 U.S. at 530.
99. Id. at 530–31.
100. Id. at 531.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 532.
103. Id. at 533; see also United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organ-
ized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Con-
vention].  The concealment theory is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
104. Convention, supra note 103, at 8.
105. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
106. Santos, 553 U.S. at 533.
107. President’s Commission on Model State Drug Laws, Economic Remedies,
§ 4(a) (1993) (emphasis added).
108. Santos, 553 U.S. at 534.
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Alito next returns to the intent of the statute and argues that the
objectives of the money laundering statute would be frustrated if “pro-
ceeds” were limited to “profits.”110  First, limiting the definition would
“immunize successful criminal enterprises during those periods when
they are operating temporarily in the red” because there would be no
“profits” from which to criminalize.111  Second, limiting the definition
would pose substantial problems of proof.112  Requiring prosecutors to
trace funds back to a particular criminal activity to prove that the sales
were profitable would be next to impossible.113  Special accounting
rules would have to be developed to make these calculations and they
would be difficult to discern because most criminal enterprises do not
keep complete and accurate business and accounting records.114  Cre-
ating a heightened burden of proof, he argues, serves no discernible
purpose in forwarding the Congressional aims of the statute.115
Alito believes that the merger problem can be avoided and
addressed via sentencing guidelines.116  He would recommend an
amendment to the money laundering sentencing guideline advising in
favor of a less stiff sentence and giving judges more discretion in impos-
ing lighter sentences than those called for by the guidelines.117
III. POST-SANTOS, PRE-FERA JURISPRUDENCE
After Santos, courts saw an influx in the number of money launder-
ing convictions coming up for appeal on the proceeds issue.118  Some
courts followed Santos, some distinguished it, and others took a middle
approach.119  Ultimately, the approaches taken by the circuits can be
grouped into three distinguishable categories: the narrow view, the
moderate view, and the broad view of Santos.120  Narrow view jurisdic-
tions have limited Santos’ “profits” definition of “proceeds” only to gam-
bling cases as Justice Stevens recommended.121  Moderate view
jurisdictions apply Santos’ “profits” definition of “proceeds” to some
underlying offenses other than illegal gambling and not to others.122
Finally, the broad view jurisdictions apply Santos’ “profits” definition to
all underlying offenses.123
110. Id. at 536.
111. Id. at 537.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 540.
114. Id. at 541.
115. Id. at 542.
116. Id. at 547.
117. Id.
118. Noonan Jr., supra note 41, at 143.
119. Id.
120. Brian Dickerson & Klodiana Basko, Confusion in Defining “Proceeds” Under the
Money Laundering Statute: A Survey of Circuit Opinions, 57 FED. LAW. 23, 24-27 (2010);
Zimarowski, supra note 11, at 1161; Current Circuit Splits, 7 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 377, 390-
91 (2011) [hereinafter Circuit Splits].
121. Zimarowski, supra note 11, at 1161; Santos, 553 U.S. at 526-27 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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A. Narrow View of Santos
The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits follow the narrow view
of Santos.124  The narrow approach does just what the title suggests—
limits the holding of Santos to its facts, only applying it to other illegal
gambling cases.125  This is the position that Justice Stevens takes in his
concurrence.126  The main justification that courts have cited for apply-
ing a narrow view is based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Marks v.
United States.127 The “Marks Rule” states that when no single rationale
explaining the result of a Supreme Court case enjoys assent of at least
five Justices, the holding of the Court should be viewed as that position
taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the nar-
rowest grounds.128
The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue in regards to drug and nar-
cotic offenses in United States v. Spencer.129 In this case, the defendant
was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, attempted possession
with the intent to distribute it, and money laundering.130  The court
held that Santos does not apply in the drug context.131  Citing Alito’s
dissent in Santos, the court points out that five of the Supreme Court
justices agreed that “proceeds” include gross revenues from the sale of
contraband and the operation of organized crime syndicates involving
such sales.132
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has not applied Santos to other predi-
cate offenses.133  In United States v. Howard,134 defendants were con-
victed of various charges relating to prostitution, illegal drug sales, and
for conspiracy to launder prostitution proceeds.135  The court cited the
Marks Rule stating that, because Santos was a plurality opinion, “the
holding of the Court for precedential purposes is the narrowest holding
that garnered five votes (Justice Stevens’).”136  The Eleventh Circuit fol-
lowed suit in United States v. Demarest,137 also citing the Marks Rule and
arguing that “[t]he narrow holding in Santos, at most, was that the gross
124. Dickerson & Basko, supra note 120, at 24; Zimarowski, supra note 11, at
1161–62 (citations omitted); Circuit Splits, supra note 120, at 390.
125. Dickerson & Basko, supra note 120, at 24.
126. See discussion, supra Part II (looking at the differences in legislative history for
the illegal gambling offense).
127. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
128. Id. at 193.  The narrowest concurrence in Santos being Justice Stevens’ limited
view that the “profits” definition only applies to illegal gambling offenses. Santos, 553 U.S.
507 (Stevens, J., concurring).
129. 592 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2009).
130. Id. at 870.
131. Id. at 879.
132. Id. at 880; Santos, 553 U.S. at 531 (Alito, J., dissenting).
133. Dickerson & Basko, supra note 120, at 25; Zimarowski, supra note 11, at 1163.
134. 309 F. App’x 760 (4th Cir. 2009).
135. Id. at 763.
136. Id. at 771 (citing Marks, 430 U.S. at 193); see also United States v. Johnson, 405
F. App’x 746 (4th Cir. 2010) (limiting Santos to illegal gambling operations and not apply-
ing it to illegal Ponzi schemes).
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receipts of an unlicensed gambling operation were not ‘proceeds’
under section 1956 . . . .”138
While the approaches taken in the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits may make sense under the Marks Rule, they are in tension with
other Supreme Court precedents.139  In Clark v. Martinez,140 the court
held that, prior to Santos, “the meaning of words in a statute cannot
change with the statute’s application.”141  In Martinez, the Court sought
to interpret certain words in a federal statute concerning alien deten-
tion for three different categories of aliens.142  The Court held that,
while a limited definition for the phrase may apply to a certain category
of aliens and not another, “[t]o give these same words a different mean-
ing for each category [within the same statute] would be to invent a
statute rather than interpret one.”143  Thus, the most limited interpre-
tation must govern all aspects of the statute.144
In Santos, Justice Stevens’ concurrence argued that the most lim-
ited interpretation (“profits”) should be applied only to illegal gam-
bling offenses.145  However, Martinez would require that this limited
interpretation also apply to all the predicate offenses.146  Both the plu-
rality and Alito’s dissent are consistent with Martinez in that they both
agree that the meaning of the term proceeds “cannot vary from one
money laundering case to the next.”147  Thus, in following Justice Ste-
vens’ concurrence, these narrow view circuits, while following one
Supreme Court case,148 are in conflict with another Supreme Court
case.149
B. Moderate View of Santos
The moderate view, followed by the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits, attempts to reconcile both the plurality and Justice Stevens’ con-
currence.150  These circuits do allow some application of the “profits”
definition outside of the context of illegal gambling, but still keep the
“gross receipts” definition for some other predicate offenses.
138. Id. at 1242.
139. Id. at 1166; Dickerson & Basko, supra note 120, at 25.
140. 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
141. Id. at 378.
142. Id. The phrase at issue was “may be detained” in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).  The
phrase was already defined for one category of aliens to mean detained as long as “reason-
ably necessary” to remove them from the country.  Zavydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689
(2001).  The Court held that this definition must also apply to the other two categories.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Santos, 553 U.S. at 525 (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 380.
147. Santos, 553 U.S. at 548.
148. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
149. Martinez, 543 U.S. at 371.
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The Third Circuit addressed the issue in United States v. Yusuf151
and United States v. Fleming.152  In Yusuf, the defendants were charged
with varying counts related to mail fraud, tax evasion, and international
money laundering.153  The Third Circuit held that unpaid taxes dis-
guised and retained by filing false tax returns through U.S. mail consti-
tute “proceeds” of mail fraud under section 1986.154  In defining
proceeds, the court followed Santos, using the “profits” definition based
on the lack of legislative history to the contrary and stating that the
proceeds in this mail fraud case were “profits.”155  However, the Third
Circuit in Fleming also held that the “profits” definition should not be
used for all predicate offenses.156  Drug trafficking, for example, is one
such offense where “gross receipts” should be used.157  In Fleming, the
defendants were convicted of narcotics possession, distribution, and
money laundering.158  For this underlying offense, the Third Circuit
cited Justice Alito’s dissent in Santos, stating that “five justices agree with
the position [that] proceeds include[s] gross revenues from the sale of
contraband and the operation of organized crime syndicates involving
such sales.”159  Thus, because the underlying offense in this case is the
sale of drugs, the Court must follow the consensus of the five justices.160
Both of these holdings show the Third Circuit applying different defini-
tions to different predicate offenses based on the legislative history of
those offenses.161  Further, we see the Third Circuit not limiting the
definition of “profits” to illegal gambling charges.162
The Sixth Circuit also applied this moderate view in United States v.
Kratt.163  The defendant in Kratt was convicted of bank fraud and
money laundering from criminally derived property under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957.164  After establishing that “proceeds” under section 1957 has
the same meaning as it does in section 1956, the court held, however,
that this case did not present the type of merger problem that Santos
was meant to avoid, and Santos only applies when the predicate offense
creates such a merger problem.165  The court applied a two-pronged
analysis in determining the nature of the merger problem for a particu-
lar predicate offense.  The merger problem in Santos, they held, is when
151. 536 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2008).
152. 287 F. App’x. 150 (3d Cir. 2008); Dickerson & Basko, supra note 120, at 1168.
153. Yusuf, 536 F.3d at 181.
154. Id. at 189.
155. Id.
156. Fleming, 287 F. App’x at 150.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 152.
159. Id. at 154 (citing Santos, 553 U.S. at 531 (Alito, J., dissenting)).
160. Id.
161. Zimarowski, supra note 11, at 1169.
162. Fleming, 287 F. App’x at 154 (in contrast to the narrow view).
163. 579 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2009).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2012) (criminalizing “knowingly engag[ing] . . . in a mone-
tary transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater that $10,000” if the
underlying criminal offense was one of the enumerated offenses, including bank fraud).
165. Kratt, 579 F.3d at 562.  The Court applied Marks by using the “narrowest
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the interpretation leads to (1) a “radical increase in the statutory maxi-
mum sentence” and (2) “only when nothing in the legislative history
suggests that Congress intended such an increase.”166  Here, the court
argued, neither section 1956 nor 1957 radically increased the statutory
maximum sentence when the predicate offense was bank fraud or mak-
ing false statements.167  In fact, they both would actually create a lower
sentence than either of the named predicate offenses.168  Thus, the
rationale of Santos in avoiding “perverse sentencing results” does not
apply to Kratt’s offenses so the court, instead, looked to prior prece-
dent, which applied the gross receipts definition.169
The Ninth Circuit has also applied this framework.170  In United
States v. Van Alstyne,171 the defendant was convicted of mail fraud as
part of a Ponzi scheme and money laundering.172  The court followed
the same rationale in Kratt, stating that proceeds means profits only in
merger situations of the kind that Scalia discussed in Santos.173  How-
ever, the court focused on the central “scheme to defraud” required by
the predicate offense rather than the legislative history or statutory
maximum sentences of the predicate offense.174  In Van Alstyne, the
nature of the Ponzi scheme required payments to investors (which
would inherently constitute money laundering under section 1956).
“Convicting Van Alstyne of money laundering for the bank transfers
inherent in the ‘scheme’ central to the mail fraud charges thus presents
a ‘merger’ problem closely parallel to the one that underlay the major-
ity result in Santos.”175  Thus, the court dismissed two of Van Alstyne’s
convictions for money laundering based on the presence of the merger
problem and applied Santos’ “profits” definition to the mail fraud
offenses.176  Even though the Sixth and Ninth Circuits looked to differ-
ent characteristics of the underlying offense, both ultimately follow the
moderate rule that, in determining which definition of “proceeds” to
apply, courts should evaluate on an offense-by-offense basis and only
apply the “profits” definition where a merger problem exists.
Like the narrow view, however, the moderate view poses a Martinez
problem.177  By evaluating on an offense-by-offense basis, the moderate
view would allow different definitions of “proceeds” to apply for differ-
ent offenses.178  Furthermore, in applying Santos on an ad hoc basis, the
166. Id.
167. Id. at 563.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 748 (6th Cir. 2000)).
170. Zimarowski, supra note 11, at 1170.
171. 584 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2009).
172. Id. at 807.
173. Id. at 814.
174. Compare Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d at 813–15, with Kratt, 579 F.3d 558, 562–64 (6th
Cir. 2009).
175. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d at 815.
176. Id. at 816.
177. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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moderate view “both invites sentencing unpredictability and opens the
statute up to constitutional attacks.”179
C. Broad View of Santos
Finally, the broad view applies Santos’ profits definition to all predi-
cate offenses and creates a bright line rule that has been followed by
some district courts.180  The Northern District of California was one of
the first to put forth this broad view in United States v. Hedlund.181  In
Hedlund, the defendant was convicted of Use of Property for the Pur-
poses of Manufacturing Marijuana and money laundering for a mort-
gage payment made on the warehouse he used to store the illegal
drugs.182  The court put substantial emphasis on Clark v. Martinez, and
noted that the plurality in Santos did not limit their holding only to
illegal gambling cases.183  Because of this precedent, “profits” must
apply to every predicate offense listed in the statute and, thus, Hed-
lund’s money laundering conviction must be vacated because the mort-
gage payment is a business expense and is not part of the profits of the
business as defined under Santos.184
The Western District of Virginia similarly rejected the narrow and
moderate approaches in favor of the broad view.  In United States v. Shel-
burne,185 the defendant was convicted of health care fraud and money
laundering based on transactions made as business expenses (not spent
from profits from the illegality).186  The court vacated the money laun-
dering conviction, holding that Santos was not limited to illegal lottery
offenses, so the “profits” definition applied.187  Further, it rejected the
moderate view’s contention that the “gross receipts” definition should
be used so long as there is not a merger problem arguing that, “[u]nder
the government’s view, Santos, as limited by Justice Stevens’ [narrower
reasoning], breaks no new ground and simply applies existing circuit
law.”188
While this approach avoids the problem that the narrow and mod-
erate views face with Martinez, it does contain a notable internal obsta-
cle.189  As we see in Hedlund, it ignores the fact that five of the nine
Justices in Santos agreed that the “gross receipts” definition should be
179. Id. at 1172.
180. Dickerson & Basko, supra note 120, at 26; Zimarowski, supra note 11, at 1172-
73.
181. No. CR-06-346-DLJ, 2008 WL 4183958 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008).
182. Id. at 1 (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012)).
183. Id. at 6.
184. Id. at 4. The decision, however, conflicts with Santos where five of the Justices
agreed that “proceeds” meant “gross receipts” in drug cases. United States v. Santos, 553
U.S. 507, 531 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
185. 563 F. Supp. 2d 601 (W.D. Va. 2008).
186. Id. at 603.
187. Id. at 607.
188. Id. (citing Government’s Brief 9 in Santos); United States v. Van Alstyne, 584
F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 2009).
189. Compare, supra Parts III.A & B, with supra Part III.C.  The broad view would not
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used for all drug trafficking and related crimes.  This has the potential
effect of extending Santos beyond the Court’s intended scope and, in
the process, hindering both the congressional intent and the teeth of
the money laundering statute.190
As can be seen with the different approaches following the deci-
sion, district and circuit courts across the country have not come to a
consensus regarding the scope and reach of Santos’ profits definition.
Because these inconsistencies create potential implications for prosecu-
tors191 and criminal defendants192 and because Santos is relevant to
other federal statutes,193 it was imperative for Congress to respond
swiftly to settle what its intentions were in drafting the MLCA.  A year
after Santos, Congress sought to do just this when enacting the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009.
IV. FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY ACT OF 2009
Congress responded to the controversy by enacting the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA).  FERA itself covers a
broad range of financial fraud offenses including mortgage, securities,
and commodities fraud.194  Showing their disapproval of the opinion,
Congress essentially overturned Santos by amending the money laun-
190. Noonan Jr., supra note 41, at 149.  In applying “profits” to all predicate
offenses, the broad view also makes proving the money laundering offense the most diffi-
cult of the three views for prosecutors. Christina M. Sindoni, Note, Global-Tech’s “Patent”
Failure: Why Congress Must Revise the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s Mens Rea After Global-
Tech, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 605, 628 (2014).
191. See Noonan Jr., supra note 41, at 152 (“[Depending on the jurisdiction], [t]o
prosecute money-laundering cases the government must now . . . take the extra step to
prove that the proceeds allegedly laundered were indeed the profits of a criminal
enterprise.”).
192. See Zimarowski, supra note 11, at 1179 (“[T]he potential for disparate punish-
ment [,depending on the jurisdiction,] for the same conduct has the possibility of stretch-
ing even further . . . .”).
193. Particularly, 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
194. President Obama expressed his intentions for the Act in a press release:
This Act provides Federal investigators and prosecutors with significant new
criminal and civil tools to assist in holding accountable those who have commit-
ted financial fraud. These legislative enhancements will help the Department of
Justice to combat mortgage fraud, securities and commodities fraud, and related
offenses, and to protect taxpayer money that has been expended on recent eco-
nomic stimulus and rescue packages. With the tools that the Act provides, the
Department of Justice and others will be better equipped to address the chal-
lenges that face the Nation in difficult economic times and to do their part to
help the Nation respond to this challenge.
Press Release, President Barack Obama (May 20, 2009), available at http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-s-386. These enhancements were thought
to be particularly helpful as the prevalence of certain financial frauds continued to rise
through the mid-2000s. See generally Cynthia A. Koller, Laura A. Patterson & Elizabeth B.
Scalf, When Moral Reasoning And Ethics Training Fail: Reducing White Collar Crime Through the
Control of Opportunities For Deviance, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 549 (2014)
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dering statute to define “proceeds” as “gross receipts” not “profits.”195
The gross receipts definition applies to both sections 1956 and 1957 of
the United States Code.196
In addition to clarifying their intent for the definition of “pro-
ceeds,” Congress also included a section entitled “Sense of the Congress
and Report Concerning Required Approval for Merger Cases” (“The
Sense”) in FERA.197
(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS. – It is the sense of the Congress that
no prosecution of an offense under section 1956 or 1957 of
title 18, United States Code, should be undertaken in combi-
nation with the prosecution of any other offense, without
prior approval of the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Criminal Division, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the
Criminal Division or the relevant United States Attorney, if the
conduct to be charged as “specified unlawful activity” in connection
with the offense under section 1956 or 1957 is so closely connected
with the conduct to be charged as the other offense that there is no
clear delineation between the two offenses.198
The Sense also requires the Attorney General to report to the
House and Senate Committees on efforts undertaken by the Depart-
ment of Justice to ensure that review and approval takes place in appro-
priate cases.199  These reports should include the number of merger
prosecutions initiated with and without approval.200  If no approval was
given for the prosecution, the Attorney General must report why.201
The Sense also requires reportage of the number of times approval was
denied for such prosecutions.202  On its face, the Sense attempts to cre-
ate a solution to the merger problem, which, Congress admits, can
occur with the “gross receipts” definition.203
Since FERA’s enactment, it is still too early to tell what effect the
amendment will have on future decisions because most of the money
laundering cases discussing FERA involve criminal acts that occurred
before FERA was enacted, so retroactivity has applied.204  However, in
195. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9) (“[T]he term ‘proceeds’ means any property derived
from or obtained or retained directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activ-
ity, including the gross receipts of such activity.”).
196. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2, 123
Stat. 1617, 1618 (2009).
197. Id. at 1618-1619.




202. § 2, 123 Stat. at 1619.
203. See discussion, infra Part V.B (arguing that the Sense does not go far enough in
addressing the merger problem).
204. See United States v. Sahabir, 880 F.Supp. 2d 377 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating that
FERA does not apply if the criminal acts occurred before the amendments were enacted;
Santos, if applicable, will govern); United States v. Nathan, 2012 WL 28604 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
4, 2012) (holding that FERA does not apply to an offense committed in 2000).  The ex
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Lindsey v. United States,205 the court seems to apply the amendment to a
crime committed in 2000—before FERA’s enactment.  In Lindsey, the
petitioner was convicted of mail, wire, and securities fraud and money
laundering in connection with a Ponzi scheme.206  Lindsey filed a
motion to vacate the sentence claiming his counsel was ineffective at
not raising a constitutional challenge to the use of the “receipts” defini-
tion rather than the “profits” definition, contrary to Santos, which was
controlling at the time.207  The court denied Lindsey’s motion and,
while it claimed that FERA is “not relevant to the Petitioner’s case,” it
nevertheless discussed FERA in the opinion.208
The FERA legislation has effectively overruled the plurality deci-
sion in Santos, and any prior ambiguity as to the meaning of “pro-
ceeds” has now been resolved.  Therefore, under all
circumstances, Petitioner’s claim that the holding in Santos ren-
dered his conviction null and void is incorrect, and his claims that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise any issue relating to
Santos, must fail.209
The court’s willingness to use FERA’s redefinition of “proceeds” to
block a section 2255 motion that is based on Santos, even to a pre-FERA
case, suggests that the amendment may prove to be successful in put-
ting the final nail in Santos’ coffin.  The next logical question, however,
is while the amendment may be successful in doing what it was set out
to do, is it adequate to solve the still present “merger problem” that the
court was so concerned about in Santos?
V. DO WE STILL HAVE A MERGER PROBLEM?
A. The Scope of Justice Scalia’s Merger Concern
Before addressing FERA’s response to the merger problem, an
analysis of Justice Scalia’s concern for the issue itself is necessary to
pinpoint exactly where the merger problem actually arises.  In Santos, the
merger concern was valid under the promotional theory of the money
laundering statute because Santos’ conviction for the illegal gambling
offense automatically established criminal liability for the money laun-
problem. See United States v. Morris, 2010 WL 1049936 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 19, 2010) (where
the alleged violations of the money laundering statute were acts completely separate from
the specified unlawful activities allegedly underlying a RICO violation, there is no risk of
merger, but the Court still assumes that the ex post facto application of the new definition
of “proceeds” in FERA does not apply).  The Court in Morris, however, does note that
“[FERA’s] existence, as well as the legislative history surrounding its addition to the
money-laundering statute, are still relevant to some extent.” Morris, 2010 WL 1049936, at
3.
205. 2010 WL 3035751 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2010).
206. Id. at 1.  The offenses related to the operation of a “Ponzi scheme to sell prom-
issory notes with no source of income other than the investors’ funds.” (quoting United
States v. Cawthon, No. 02-12360, slip op. at 2 (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2003) (per curiam)).
207. Lindsey, 2010 WL 3035751, at 2; 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).
208. Lindsey, 2010 WL 3035751, at 3.
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dering offense.210  Santos was convicted of violating the statute with the
intent to promote the carrying on of the specified illegal gambling
activity.211  This included the act of paying the lottery’s winners, run-
ners, and collectors with the gross receipts of the business in order to
promote the carrying on of the lottery.212  If the winners and, particu-
larly, the employees receive their portion of the proceeds, the business
will presumably carry on because the runners and collectors will have
more of an incentive to continue working.  As Scalia rightly points out,
in such circumstances, these acts, while constituting a violation of the
promotional theory, also violate the illegal lottery statute, hence, creat-
ing a merger problem and heightened sentencing for the same act.213
While Scalia is correct that the merger problem arises in these par-
ticular promotional theory cases, his analysis and concerns are over-
stated.  First, the merger problem, while not limited to illegal gambling
offenses, only applies to some promotional theory cases where the pred-
icate crimes involve, or sometimes require, financial transactions.  For
example, as discussed earlier in United States v. Van Alstyne,214 the defen-
dant was convicted of mail fraud and money laundering.215  The court
held that mail fraud is an underlying offense that can create a merger
problem because, like in this case, “[t]he very nature of the scheme
[central to the mail fraud charges] . . . required some payments to
investors for it to be at all successful.”216  Van Alstyne’s conviction of
money laundering for the bank transfers inherent in the mail fraud
charges presented a merger problem, radically increasing the statutory
maximum sentence.217  Similarly, in United States v. Kratt,218 the court
held that bank fraud and false statement offenses also create a merger
problem because “nearly every consummated bank fraud and false
statement offense involves depositing, withdrawing, transferring or
exchanging funds derived from the [section 1957 money laundering]
offense.”219
However, this is not the case for underlying offenses that do not
deal with financial transactions because a conviction under such an
offense would not necessarily mean a conviction under the money laun-
210. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
211. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2005).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 515–16.
214. 584 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2009).
215. Mail fraud has two elements: (1) having devised or intending to devise a
scheme to defraud (or perform specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the mail for the
purpose of executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme (or specified fraudulent
acts). 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West 2008).
216. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d at 815.
217. Id.
218. 579 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2009).
219. Id. at 563. See also United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2012) (find-
ing that an underlying mortgage fraud offense creates a merger problem when the
money laundering convictions were based on paying the essential expenses of the mort-
gage fraud offense).  The court in Kratt, however, found that, because the merger prob-






      05/20/2014   11:05:20
35013-nde_28-2 Sheet No. 88 Side B      05/20/2014   11:05:20
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-2\NDE206.txt unknown Seq: 22 14-MAY-14 13:06
600 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 28
dering statute, which requires a fraudulent financial transaction.  For
example, under section 1961(1) of title 18, certain RICO offenses like
murder, kidnapping, false use of passport, etc., which are termed “spec-
ified unlawful” activities in the money laundering statute, may not
require a fraudulent financial transaction in order to be criminal-
ized.220  Thus, if such a transaction was made to promote the offense,
the underlying crime can be prosecuted under the money laundering
statute, but as a separate offense and no merger problem would arise.
Therefore, even though the merger problem may arise in promotional
theory cases, it does not arise in all promotional theory cases.
Second, Santos’ holding reaches both the promotional and con-
cealment theories of the money laundering statute, yet the merger
problem does not arise in concealment theory cases.  “There is no con-
cern that the evidence used to convict for the underlying predicate
offense would also prove a violation of the money laundering statute
under the concealment theory.”221  Regardless of whether or not the
predicate offense requires a financial transaction element, concealment
theory cases never create a merger problem.  Under the concealment
theory, the government must prove that the defendant conducted a
fraudulent financial transaction with the intent to conceal or disguise
the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity.222  Most predicate
offenses do not require an element of proof that the defendant con-
ducted a fraudulent financial transaction with the intent to conceal or
disguise the proceeds.  Proving the predicate offense would, therefore,
not automatically prove concealment under section (a)(1)(B)(i) so
there is no merger problem.  For example, had the money laundering
conviction in Santos been under the concealment theory, the merger
problem would not have been a concern because the illegal gambling
statute only criminalizes the conducting, financing, managing, supervis-
ing, directing, or owning of an illegal gambling business.223  Santos
being guilty of one of these acts “would not automatically establish a
violation of the federal money laundering statute under the conceal-
ment theory.”224  This fact applies to other predicate crimes listed in
section 1956(c)(7).225  Therefore, the merger problem does not apply
to concealment theory cases under the money laundering statute.
Because Santos covers section 1956 more broadly, it also has impli-
cations for international money laundering offenses, which are codified
in section (a)(2) of the statute.226  The international provision is simi-
220. “Specified Unlawful Activity” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(A) (2012)
under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2012 & Supp. I 2013). See also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(c)(7)(D)–(F) (2012) for other predicate offenses that may not require fraudulent
financial transactions to satisfy a violation, yet may also be a violation of the money laun-
dering statute if a fraudulent financial transaction is made to promote the carrying on of
that activity.
221. Gurulé, supra note 3, at 357.
222. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
223. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (2012).
224. Gurulé, supra note 3, at 358.
225. See id. (for a discussion of this application to other predicate crimes).
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lar to its domestic counterpart in (a)(1) because it criminalizes both
the promotion227 and concealment228 of the specified unlawful activ-
ity.229  However, like with the concealment theory of the domestic stat-
ute, Scalia’s merger problem does not apply.  Again, “[p]roof of the
criminal activity that generated the property involved in the interna-
tional transportation, transmission, or transfer of a monetary instru-
ment or funds does not automatically prove a violation of section
1956(a)(2)(B)(i).”230  However, unlike the domestic statute, the inter-
national money laundering statute’s promotional theory has no risk of a
merger problem.  As the statute is written, proof that the transporta-
tion, transmission, or transfer involved “proceeds” of specified unlawful
activity is not required.231  There is no requirement that these proceeds
be made from fraudulent means.  Because using illegal proceeds of the
specified unlawful activity is not a required element of the international
money laundering offense, Santos’ definition of “proceeds” does not
apply.
Thus, while Scalia’s opinion in Santos applies to and, therefore,
potentially alters many different types of money laundering prosecu-
tions, the merger concern argument only applies to a certain subset of
cases—those that deal with the promotional theory of the domestic
money laundering statute in section 1956(a)(I)(A)(i).  And within this
subset of cases, the rationale only applies to those cases where the
underlying predicate offense deals with fraudulent financial transac-
tions.  Scalia’s holding is drastically overstated.
B. Does FERA Go Far Enough?
While Scalia’s merger concern is relatively cabined to a narrow sub-
set of cases under the promotional theory of section 1956, the problem
still exists.  Because  criminal defendants could face up to twenty more
years in prison under such circumstances where a merger exists, action
must be taken.  Further, in implementing FERA and clarifying that
“proceeds” means gross receipts, Congress has swung the pendulum too
far in the opposite direction and, in doing so, revived the merger
problem.
227. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (2012).
228. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
229. Id.  “Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport,
transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to
or through a place outside the United States or to a place in the United States from or
through a place outside the United States (A) with the intent to promote the carrying on
of a specified unlawful activity; or (B) knowing that the monetary instrument or funds
involved . . . represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity and knowing that
such transportation, transmission or transfer is designed in whole or in part (i) to conceal
or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . .” But see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
230. Gurulé, supra note 3, at 360–61.
231. Id. at 360.  The domestic statute includes the words “financial transaction
which involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity” applying to both the promo-
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Congress’ attempt to place some restrictions on prosecutions that
contain merger problems does not go far enough.  The “Sense” merely
provides guidance rather than bright line rules.  The section simply
states that it is “the sense of the Congress that no prosecution of an
offense under section 1956 or 1957 of title 18, United States Code,
should be undertaken . . . without prior approval” where a merger prob-
lem exists.232  This language suggests no definite protections for crimi-
nal defendants in these cases.233  While it is still too early to tell whether
or not this provision will actually have teeth because Santos retroactivity
still applies to most money laundering appeals on merger concern
grounds,234 the provision’s weak, purely discretionary language does
not provide the adequate insurance needed to prevent these prosecu-
tions regardless of how narrow the category of cases it actually affects is.
C. Finding a Balance
Justice Scalia and Congress seem to be on two ends of the spec-
trum when determining adequate protections for criminal defendants
who are convicted under both the money laundering statute and a spec-
ified underlying offense for the same acts.  We must find a balance
between each approach.  The following three proposals for striking that
balance attack the problem from the back and the front ends: (1)
amending the federal sentencing guidelines for money laundering
prosecutions, (2) amending the money laundering statute itself to clar-
ify the scope of the promotional theory, and (3) amending Department
of Justice (DOJ) procedures in their policy manual.
First, and most importantly, to avoid the underlying consequence
of the merger problem, the United States Sentencing Commission
should amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for money launder-
ing prosecutions.  In such prosecutions where a true merger problem
arises,235 the guidelines should provide a presumption for (1) consoli-
dating the sentences for both offenses and (2) sentencing only under
the predicate offense if that predicate offense has a lesser penalty than
the money laundering offense.  This amendment would provide the
most direct and effective means of controlling unfair sentencing dispar-
ities without grappling with “complex interpretations of the statute’s
232. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, § 2(g)(1),
123 Stat. 1617 (2009) (emphasis added).  The provision could have been worded more
strongly so as to require prior approval and reporting requirements (“no prosecution may
be undertaken . . . .”).
233. “Clearly, any prohibition on prosecutions implicating a merger problem is not
absolute, and whether [the] authorization and reporting requirements are any kind of
effective deterrent to such prosecution remains  to be seen.”  Jon Reidy, The Problem of
‘Proceeds’ in the Era of FERA, 37 AM. J. CRIM. L. 317, 328 (2010). But cf. Tiffany M. Joslyn,
FERA’s Silver Lining—An Account of NACDL’s Efforts Combating Overcriminalization, 33 CHAM-
PION 55, 56 (2009) (“The language of Section 2(g) is a positive and crucial step in
preventing unfairness [from merger problems].”).
234. See discussion supra Part IV.
235. This guideline would not apply to cases where merger problems do not arise—
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language.”236  Had this been implemented prior to Santos, the prosecu-
tion would have consolidated Santos’ illegal gambling and money laun-
dering offenses and subsequently sentenced him under the guidelines
for the offense with the lesser penalty—the illegal gambling offense
which imposes a 60-month sentence rather than 210 months for the
money laundering offense.
Second, in terms of attacking the problem from the front end,
Congress could amend the promotional theory of the money launder-
ing statute itself, as Justice Breyer suggests in his Santos concurrence, to
provide a specific definition of “promoting the carrying on.”  Congress
should stipulate that the fraudulent financial transaction must follow in
time the specified unlawful activity in order to constitute a violation
under the promotional theory of the money laundering statute.  This
would prevent any merger problems from occurring because the act
constituting the money laundering offense would be separate and dis-
tinct from the act that constituted the underlying offense.  If this defini-
tion was specified in the statute during Santos, paying off the winning
gamblers and the salaries of the collectors would no longer constitute a
violation of the promotional theory of the money laundering statute
because the acts were not separate in time from the commission of the
illegal gambling business (already a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a))—
they were part of the commission of the same overall crime, and the
illegal gambling offense had not yet been completed.  Thus, Santos
could only be convicted of, and subsequently sentenced under, the ille-
gal gambling offense.
Finally, the Department of Justice could amend their policy man-
ual by recommending not prosecuting the money laundering offense in
cases where a true merger problem arose,237 absent exigent circum-
stances.238 Similar to the Sense of the Congress, senior DOJ official
authorization would be required, but those officials should not author-
ize prosecution unless there are outstanding circumstances which
render the prosecution necessary or compelling.  Applying this policy
amendment to Santos, DOJ officials would not have prosecuted Santos
under the money laundering statute because of the clear potential for a
merger problem.
The best option of the three would be to amend the promotional
theory of the money laundering statute.  This would provide the most
binding protection against merger prosecutions from the start and
would clear up any confusion regarding the application and scope of
the promotional theory.  However, a statutory amendment would
236. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 531 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Jus-
tices Stevens and Alito also allude in their concurrence and dissent, respectively, to
amending the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 527 & 547.
237. See supra note 235.
238. For a general discussion of how the Department of Justice can amend their
manual for other procedural policies, such as deferred prosecution agreements, see Kris-
tie Xian, Note, The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the Context of Iranian
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require congressional deliberation and other bureaucratic hurdles.  It
would, thus, not likely lead to a timely solution to the problem.
Implementing both the sentencing guidelines amendment and the
DOJ policy manual amendment could be an adequate alternative.  If
the DOJ decides to move forward with a merger prosecution, despite
the supplemental policy manual recommendation to not prosecute
merger cases, the amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines
would act as a second protection, taking care of any sentencing dispari-
ties by requiring the lighter of the two sentences.  Working together,
these recommendations provide more comprehensive and absolute
protections than FERA does for criminal defendants who fall in this
narrow subset of cases where a merger may occur.  Furthermore, they
strike a balance between Scalia’s over-inclusive “profits” definition and
Congress’ under-inclusive “gross receipts” definition.
CONCLUSION
Post-Santos jurisprudence shows that the Supreme Court’s plurality
opinion defining “proceeds” in the money laundering statute as “net
profits” rather than “gross receipts” has not cleared up the debate over
the correct definition of the term.  Further, Congress’ albeit swift
response to that decision swung the pendulum too far in the other
direction, reversing the holding and calling for a “gross receipts” defini-
tion.  Congress’ attempt to account for the Court’s concern over
merger problems and heightened sentences, however, does not go far
enough.
While only relevant in a small subset of money laundering cases
that (1) deal with predicate offenses that require fraudulent financial
transactions and (2) promote the carrying on of that predicate offense
under the promotional theory of the money laundering statute, the
merger problem, nevertheless, has serious and potentially unjust impli-
cations for criminal defendants.  In order to avoid these problems, the
United States Sentencing Commission should amend the sentencing
guidelines for money laundering prosecutions and require sentencing
under the lesser of the two punishments when true merger problems
arise.  Congress should also amend the promotional theory of the
money laundering statute to more explicitly state that it applies only
where the fraudulent financial transaction giving way to the money
laundering offense is separate and distinct, following in time the com-
pleted commission of the predicate offense.  Finally, the Department of
Justice should include a provision in their policy manual advising senior
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